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More Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws
The late 1950s and early 1960s must have been an exciting time for
choice-of-law scholars. Brainerd Currie published his landmark studies
of Milliken v. Pratt 1 and Grant v. McAuliffe2 in 1958, and these had an
immediate and profound effect on the field. 3 Within a few years, a
number of other scholars published their best work, either building on
or reacting to Currie.4 Yet while Currie is remembered as the father of
modem choice-of-law theory, he was initially reluctant to portray his
ideas as general theory. His studies of married women's contracts and
tort survival statutes, for example, were carefully limited to those partic-
ular problems, with few pretensions to articulating a broader method.5
But the implications of Currie's analysis for choice-of-law theory
were too obvious to avoid, and Currie soon saw the need to present his
ideas in a more general form. The occasion he chose was, like this, an
annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools, and at a
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Visiting Professor of
Law, University of Michigan Law School.
Presented to the Conflict of Laws Section at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the
American Association of Law Schools. I am grateful to participants for their helpful
comments. I would also like to thank David Currie and Henna Hill Kay for
commenting on an earlier draft.
1. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
2. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
3. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Law Method, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the
Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958). These articles are reprinted as chapters
two and three of Currie's SELECTED EssAYs ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1963) [herein-
after Currie, SELECTED EssAYs].
4. See, e.g., Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963);
D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965); A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1962); Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to
Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463 (1960); Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in
Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966); A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE
LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965).
5. See, e.g., Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 107 (explaining that the
analysis of Milliken v. Pratt offers a solution "not for conflict of laws in general, nor
for the whole vexed problem of contracts in the conflict of laws, nor for all questions
of validity, but only for this one, small, trite, and not very practical problem concern-
ing married women's contracts").
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roundtable held on December 29, 1958, Currie delivered a short paper
entitled Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws. Subsequently
published in the 1959 volume of the Duke Law Journal6 and then as
chapter four of Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, 7 this talk constitutes
Currie's most succinct statement of governmental interest analysis-
especially the last four pages, which set forth Currie's method in a sim-
ple series of five steps. For this reason, Notes on Methods and Objectives is
probably Currie's most cited article.
I propose on this occasion to reconsider Currie's approach in the
hope of freeing myself, and perhaps some other scholars, from his long
shadow. We have in the past twenty-five years improved our under-
standing of choice of law in ways that move well beyond Currie's
insights. Yet Currie's writings-including his particular formulation of a
choice-of-law method-continue to dominate discussion and set the
agenda. Thus, recent books by two noted and active conflicts scholars
are devoted in large measure to defending or criticizing Currie, with
most subsequent work relegated to footnotes.8 Generally speaking, the
work of scholars classified as interest analysts tends to be measured by
its fidelity to Currie, while scholars who reject interest analysis set them-
selves in opposition to Currie alone without seriously engaging anyone
or anything else.
Why this should be so is not entirely clear. Brainerd Currie's work
unquestionably marked a turning point in conflicts scholarship, but the
time to debate Currie on his terms has long since passed. To be sure,
many of Currie's ideas still make sense, and we should use these
(together with the insights of his critics and supporters) to build a better
approach. But Brainerd Currie's "governmental interest analysis"
should no longer provide the benchmark against which other ideas are
measured. It is time for scholars in the choice-of-law field to begin
debating each other.
Ironically, it seems that the best way to get beyond Currie is to
debate him one last time in order to put his ideas in perspective. And
precisely because it is so succinct, Currie's Notes on Methods and Objectives
in the Conflict of Laws provides a convenient vehicle for reexamining his
work. The discussion below therefore uses this neatly packaged presen-
tation to explore respects in which Currie's ideas remain current and
respects in which they have been or should be superseded. When fin-
ished, I hope to reach some conclusions that provide the basis for a new
agenda.
Part I of this Article briefly restates Currie's method as presented to
the AALS thirty years ago. Part II then offers a critique of this method
6. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in Conflicts of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171.
7. See supra note 3.
8. Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 RECUEIL DES COURS 9
(1989-III); L. BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAws: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
(199 1). The second half of Professor Brilmayer's book begins to articulate an alter-
native approach.
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that contains the elements of an alternative approach. The critical step,
described in Part II-A, is to reorient choice-of-law analysis by viewing it
in its ordinary procedural context. This means understanding choice of
law as part of the process of defining the elements of a claim or defense,
to be resolved accordingly. In litigation, each party offers its version of
the facts and argues that it is entitled to some sort of relief under the law
applicable to those facts. The court must decide whether the law cited
gives the parties the relief they seek on the facts alleged. Choice of law
is merely one aspect of this determination-one that is not qualitatively
distinct from other, more familiar aspects.
Part II-B considers some implications of this reorientation for
choice-of-law analysis. While at first blush it seems to confirm Currie's
insights, carefully working through the choice-of-law process from this
perspective suggests abandoning or modifying central tenets of interest
analysis. These include (1) the initial presumption of forum law; (2) the
state's power to define its own interests; (3) the idea that the renvoi is no
longer a problem; (4) the existence of "unprovided-for" cases; and (5)
the resolution of true conflicts by applying forum law. Part III con-
cludes with a proposed list of steps to follow in resolving choice-of-law
disputes together with some suggestions for future research.
I. Methods and Objectives: A Summary
"The central problem of conflict of laws," Currie says, "may be defined
... as that of determining the appropriate rule of decision when the
interests of two or more states are in conflict-in other words, of deter-
mining which interest shall yield." 9 This problem is unavoidable in a
world in which different sovereigns may enact different laws. It could
perhaps be solved by treaty or federation, but even these solutions have
difficulties, and in any event the appropriate political actors simply
"have not done the job." °10
We are left, then, with "the resources of jurisprudence," and it is
judges who must bring order to the jumbled mix of conflicting state
laws."I At first, Currie observes, the judges try to hide what they are
doing, even from themselves. Rather than admit that they are assigning
priorities to the policies of sovereign states, they talk about "metaphysi-
cal questions concerning the nature of law and its abstract operation in
space."' 12 From these, they fashion a system of rules for determining
which state's law must, in the nature of things, control. If all states can
be persuaded to adopt these rules, uniformity and certainty in the
administration of the law will have been achieved and the choice-of-law
project will be complete.
9. Currie, supra note 6, at 173.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id at 173-74.
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The problem, Currie continues, is that choice-of-law rules formu-
lated in this manner "have not worked and cannot be made to work"
because they are not consonant with actual state interests.1 3 As a result,
the rules create false problems by requiring a choice in cases where
there is no real conflict of interests. Worse, the rules "solve" many of
these false problems in an irrational manner by calling for the law of an
uninterested state and thereby defeating another state's interest without
advancing any interest of the state whose law is applied. 14
On top of that, courts "simply will not always remain oblivious to
the true operation of a system which, though speaking the language of
metaphysics, strikes down the legitimate application of the policy of a
state, especially when that state is the forum." 15 The judges therefore
load up on "escape devices" that enable them to manipulate outcomes.
This works to everyone's advantage when a "sensitive and ingenious
court can detect an absurd result and avoid it,"16 but it leaves us to
defend the system by arguing that the unacceptable results it inevitably
produces can be avoided by disingenuous judging. Moreover, there is a
constant danger that judges who lack sensitivity and ingenuity may
employ the escape devices to avoid proper results that the rules direct
(albeit fortuitously). And even with these devices, "instances of
mechanical operation of the rules to produce indefensible results are by
no means rare."1 7 Consequently, not only do the rules defeat state
interests, but they fail even to achieve the benefits of uniformity and
predictability. 18
Nor, Currie explains, can these problems be solved by devising dif-
ferent choice-of-law rules, for where state interests genuinely conflict, no
judicially developed rule is adequate:
a court is in no position to "weigh" the competing interests, or evaluate
their relative merits, and choose between them accordingly ....
[A]ssessment of the respective values of the competing legitimate inter-
ests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is a
political function of a very high order. This is a function which should
not be committed to courts in a democracy. It is a function which the
courts cannot perform effectively, for they lack the necessary resources. 19
There is, according to Currie, only one body competent to make
authoritative judgments about the relative importance of state policies-
the United States Congress. But Congress has not acted and is not likely
to act in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, we should at least
"admit the teachings of sociological jurisprudence into the conceptualis-
tic precincts of conflict of laws" by choosing the applicable law on the
13. Id. at 174.
14. Id.




19. Id. at 176.
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basis of actual state interests. 20 This, Currie concludes, implies a
method along the following lines:
1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the court should
be expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision found in
the law of the forum.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should furnish the
rule of decision, the court should, first of all, determine the governmental
policy expressed in the law of the forum. It should then inquire whether
the relation of the forum to the case is such as to provide a legitimate
basis for the assertion of an interest in the application of that policy. This
process is essentially the familiar one of construction or interpretation.
Just as we determine by that process how a statute applies in time, and
how it applies to marginal domestic situations, so we may determine how
it should be applied to cases involving foreign elements in order to effec-
tuate the legislative purpose.
3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy
expressed by the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an inter-
est in the application of its policy.
4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the applica-
tion of its policy, but that the foreign state has, it should apply the foreign
law.
5. If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the applica-
tion of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the
foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy,
and, a fortiori, it should apply the law of the forum if the foreign state has
no such interest.2 1
I. Critique and Comparison
A. Putting Choice of Law in Context
The problem with this analysis is that Currie starts with the wrong ques-
tion. That is, Currie assumes that choice-of-law problems arise only in
multistate cases, and he therefore defines the inquiry in terms of choos-
ing between the potentially conflicting laws of different states. Currie is
not the only person to do this, of course. On the contrary, I think it fair
to say that probably every other choice-of-law scholar defines the ques-
tion in similar terms.
One consequence of thinking about choice of law in these terms is
that it restricts the field to allocating the lawmaking power of sovereign
states. But while defining the limits of legislative jurisdiction is
undoubtedly part of the choice-of-law process, we cannot know whether
it is the whole process without asking a more fundamental question: how
do we know when a case presents a choice-of-law problem? The answer
20. Id. at 177-78.
21. Id. at 178. Currie produced several less well known lists of steps to follow in
analyzing choice-of-law cases. See Currie, Comments on Babcock v.Jackson, 63 COLUM.
L. REv. 1233, 1242-43 (1963); Kay, supra note 8, at 76 (reprinting a list prepared by
Currie in 1964 for inclusion in a casebook). These later lists differ in some respects,
reflecting changes in Currie's thinking. Where pertinent, the discussion below
includes such modifications.
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to this question may-indeed, as the remainder of this Article suggests,
does-reveal choice of law in a light that clarifies both the nature of the
problem and its solution.
So how do we know what cases present choice-of-law problems? In
a sense, the answer is easy: any case in which more than one law is appli-
cable to determine the parties' rights in the litigation. But that is too
easy. How do we know when more than one law applies? To answer
that, we need to forget (or at least to put aside) broad theoretic ques-
tions about allocating legislative jurisdiction and start with a simple
complaint and some basic propositions about the legal system. We
need, in other words, to examine choice of law from the "bottom up"
rather than from the "top down."
A lawsuit is a claim by one party that he or she is entitled to relief
from another party because of something that happened or failed to
happen. To recover, the claimant must establish some set of facts and
show that, because these facts are true, some rule of law entitles the
claimant to a remedy. The complaint sets forth the events that suppos-
edly give rise to the right to relief. The plaintiff pleads: "A, B, C, and D
happened. Therefore I am entitled to damages." Whether the plaintiff
is in fact entitled to damages (or whatever remedy is requested) depends
first on whether A, B, C, and D actually happened, and second on
whether, if A, B, C, and D happened, there is a law providing for
recovery.
The first determination (whether A, B, C, and D happened) is made
through one of the legal system's various factfinding mechanisms: trial,
summary judgment, stipulation, judicial notice. The second determina-
tion (whether plaintiff is entitled to recover on those facts) is made
through one of the mechanisms for testing the legal sufficiency of a
party's arguments: motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (i.e.,
FRCP 12(b)(6) or demurrer), argument over jury instructions, summary
judgment, directed verdict. Thejudge makes this second determination
by interpreting the law offered by plaintiff in support of his or her claim
and deciding what facts must be proved to recover-deciding, in other
words, what the elements of the claim are.
To illustrate, suppose a plaintiff files a complaint alleging that the
defendant ran a stop sign on a side street at sixty miles per hour and hit
the plaintiff, a pedestrian who was crossing the street at the time. The
plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. The defendant
moves to dismiss the punitive damages claim on the ground that these
allegations fail to establish a right to such damages. The court must
decide whether running a stop sign on a side street at sixty miles per
hour is conduct that warrants punitive damages. Given these facts, the
claim would probably survive if the court found punitive damages
authorized on a showing of recklessness or gross negligence; but it
would be dismissed if the court required some higher threshold, such as
deliberate intent to inflict harm.
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Such decisions are standard fare in ordinary litigation. How the
court makes them depends on whether the rule invoked by the plaintiff
is common or statutory law. If plaintiff relies on common law, the court
will presumably decide whether the plaintiff states a claim by reading
prior precedents in light of whatever equitable and policy arguments are
offered to distinguish them. If the plaintiff relies on a statute, the court's
decision will turn on its approach to statutory construction. The statute
may clearly state that punitive damages are available on a particular
showing, in which case the language will almost certainly control. If the
statute's language is unclear, however, the interpretive problem
becomes more difficult. Interpreting statutes to fill gaps or resolve
ambiguities is quite controversial, 22 but whatever technique the courts
of a particular state use provides the mechanism for determining the
elements of the plaintiff's claim.
Whether the court must decide a choice-of-law question depends
on how the defendant answers the complaint. The defendant may
respond to plaintiff's claim for punitive damages in at least four ways:
(1) deny that the facts alleged are true; (2) admit that the facts alleged
are true but deny that the law awards punitive damages on those facts
(for example, argue that plaintiff must show deliberate intent to cause
injury); (3) admit that the facts alleged are true but argue that a different
rule of law applies and prevents plaintiff from recovering punitive dam-
ages; or (4) admit that the facts alleged are true but plead additional
facts that implicate a different rule of law under which plaintiff cannot
recover punitive damages. The third and fourth responses present a
choice-of-law problem in that they require the court to choose between
potentially inconsistent laws.
Consider the third response. Assume, for example, that plaintiff
bases his or her claim on a statute authorizing punitive damages when
defendant's gross negligence causes a "vehicular collision." The
defendant moves to dismiss, arguing that this statute applies only to col-
lisions between vehicles and that single car accidents remain under the
common law, which (let us suppose) requires showing deliberate intent
to cause injury. This presents the court with a straightforward choice-
of-law problem: is the plaintiff's claim governed by the statute or by the
common law?
The first question to ask in addressing this problem is whether the
laws actually conflict-whether, in other words, there are reasonable
grounds for believing that both laws might apply. The apparent applica-
bility of the common law seems clear, so the court must decide whether
there is any basis for concluding that the punitive damages statute also
applies. If, as the defendant contends, the phrase "vehicular collision"
refers only to accidents between vehicles, the laws do not conflict and
22. There is an enormous literature on the subject. Summaries of the basic posi-
tions may be found in Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the
Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 691 (1987), and C. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE
Riirrs REVOLUTON ch. 4 (1990). See also infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff's recovery is limited to the remedy allowed at common law.
If the plaintiff is right, however, and the statute reaches any accident
involving a vehicle, there is a conflict of laws.
Which of these interpretations should the court choose? Hopefully,
the statute's language will make the decision an easy one. If it does not,
a more complicated process of interpretation will be required. In any
event, suppose the court agrees with the plaintiff that the statute reaches
any accident involving a vehicle. This means that both the statute and
the common law appear applicable-one allowing, the other prohibit-
ing, punitive damages in this case. The court must therefore employ
some further principle of interpretation to choose between them. The
court may, for example, conclude that the statute displaces the common
law based on principles of legislative supremacy. Alternatively, the
court could find that the state's lawmakers have provided alternative
remedies, leaving plaintiffs free to elect the one they prefer.
A choice-of-law problem may similarly arise if the defendant selects
the fourth option and pleads additional facts suggesting the applicability
of another law. Suppose, for instance, that the defendant answers that
he or she is a police officer and that the accident occurred while he or
she was answering a call. The defendant argues that these facts establish
an affirmative defense under a different statute prohibiting awards of
exemplary damages against police officers acting within the scope of
their employment. Once again, the court must choose between two
seemingly applicable laws that require inconsistent results in this case: a
statute authorizing punitive damages in cases involving vehicular colli-
sions and a statute prohibiting such damages when the defendant is a
police officer. Here, the court might rely on priority of enactment and
hold that the later enacted provision creates an exception to the earlier
of the two statutes.
2 3
This discussion suggests several points. First, it suggests that
choice-of-law problems are not limited to cases with multistate contacts,
but may arise in wholly domestic cases as well. Upon reflection, this is
hardly surprising. A conflict of laws, after all, is just that-a clash of
legal rules, not legal systems-and such clashes may arise among the
laws of a single system. Legislators are seldom fully versed in their own
work, much less the work of courts or earlier legislatures. Moreover,
laws that do not appear to overlap when enacted may come into conflict
through judicial interpretation. As a result, there are inevitably overlap-
ping and inconsistent rules of decision within a single jurisdiction.
Second, the process of determining whether there is a conflict and, if
so, how that conflict should be resolved is merely the familiar one of
determining the elements of a claim or defense. A choice-of-law prob-
lem thus arises whenever the parties disagree about what law or laws
23. See, e.g., 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 51.02 & n.7 (N. Singer rev. 4th ed. 1984).
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determine the legal sufficiency of their contentions. 24 Resolving such
disputes is a two-step process of interpretation. In the first step, the
court identifies the kinds of facts that make each law applicable, usually
by examining the law's internal logic and purpose. Then, if a conflict is
revealed, the court resolves it with an additional set of interpretive tools,
including such familiar techniques as reading statutes in pari materia or
invoking canons of construction like the principle that implied repeals
are disfavored and specific provisions are not controlled by general
provisions.
2 5
Third, moving from wholly domestic cases to cases with multistate
contacts does not change the essential nature of the interpretive prob-
lem. A lawsuit with multistate contacts is still just a lawsuit. The plain-
tiff still alleges that because something happened he or she is entitled to
a remedy. The court must still determine whether the facts alleged are
true, and if they are true, whether some rule of positive law confers a
right to recover. Making this determination is still a problem of inter-
preting the laws offered by the parties to support their contentions. The
only difference is that, instead of asking whether the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant was grossly negligent or not acting within the scope
of his or her employment, we ask whether the plaintiff must prove that
he or she is from the state or that the accident occurred within the state.
The spatial reach of a law, in other words, is simply another element of a
claim or defense based on that law, to be determined accordingly.
It follows that if the parties do raise a choice-of-law problem in a
multistate case, it can be resolved with basically the same two-step pro-
cess used in domestic cases. Thus, the court should begin by examining
the laws in issue to determine whether both may potentially apply-i.e.,
to determine whether there is a conflict. What makes this difficult is that
lawmakers seldom think about multistate cases and therefore seldom
specify the territorial contacts that make their laws applicable. 2 6 But this
means only that the judge cannot rely on plain language and must
engage in the more difficult interpretive task of filling a gap to cover
uncontemplated circumstances-something courts do all the time in
defining the elements of a claim.2 7 If this process reveals that more than
24. We could require the court to raise choice-of-law issues on its own motion.
As the law now stands, however, the argument that a claim or defense is insufficient
may be waived. See, e.g., Brule v. Southworth, 611 F.2d 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1979);
Simpson v. Providence Wash. Ins. Group, 608 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1979);
Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Shondell, 174 F.2d 587, 590 (8th Cir. 1949). As a
practical matter, this leaves the decision to make an issue of choice of law to the
parties.
25. For a discussion and analysis of examples, see Kramer, Rethinking Choice of
Law, 90 CoLuM. L. REv. 277, 284-89 (1990).
26. This is not always true. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-34-7 (1982)(no-fault
insurance); TEx. INs. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981) (insurance contracts).
Such provisions are rare, however.
27. Consider, for example, the well known line of cases in which the Supreme
Court defined the elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; including what must
be pleaded to establish municipal liability, see Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
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one state's law applies, the court must, as in domestic cases, employ
some further principle of interpretation to choose between them. This
too may prove difficult because, rather than simply accommodating the
need for coherence within a single legal system, the court must worry
about accommodating the objectives of independent sovereigns. As
explained below, however, while accommodating the policies of differ-
ent states changes the form of the solution, it does not affect its funda-
mental purpose or the legitimacy of the process.
28
B. Implications for Governmental Interest Analysis
Suggesting that choice of law is an aspect of determining the elements of
a claim or defense seems at first to confirm Currie's insight that the
choice-of-law process "is essentially the familiar one of construction or
interpretation."' 29 But this is true only in a superficial sense, for if one
examines Currie's method closely, it becomes clear that analyzing choice
of law from this perspective has profound implications for interest anal-
ysis. The best way to see this is by reexamining Currie's method as out-
lined in Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws.
1. The Initial Presumption of Forum Law
Start with the first step: "Normally... the court should be expected...
to apply the rule of decision found in the law of the forum." °3 0 Currie
developed this initial presumption of forum law while analyzing Walton
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 3 1 an action by a citizen of Arkansas injured by
employees of a Delaware corporation in Saudi Arabia. A New York fed-
eral court dismissed, holding that New York choice-of-law rules required
plaintiff to rely on the law of Saudi Arabia but that plaintiff had not
proved the content of that law.3 2 Currie thought it ludicrous for New
436 U.S. 658 (1978); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); who must
plead the good or bad faith of the acting government official, see Tenny v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980); what kinds of
damages are recoverable, see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (198 1); and whether exhaustion of state remedies is
required, see Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
28. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
29. Currie, supra note 6, at 178.
30. Id. Currie first explored this idea in On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum,
58 COLUM. L. REv. 964 (1958), subsequently reprinted as chapter one of Currie,
SELECTED EssAys, supra note 3. Professor Kay suggests that Currie may have aban-
doned this first step because it is not included in his later lists. Kay, supra note 8, at
75. But the later lists still begin the analysis only "[w]hen a court is asked to apply
the law of a foreign state .... " id. at 76, which reflects the initial presumption of
forum law. Certainly it is unlikely that Currie would have abandoned a major tenet of
interest analysis without a word of explanation. Instead, while Currie did soften his
early position that forum law should be used to decide true conflicts, id. at 68-73, he
continued even in his late writings to rely on this initial presumption of forum law to
solve a variety of problems. See, e.g., Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 779-80 (1963).
31. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 35 U.S. 872 (1956).
32. Id. at 542-43.
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York to prefer another state's law absent a showing that the other state
was interested. The "normal and natural" practice, Currie urged, is to
presume that forum law applies unless and until a party who stands to
benefit from another state's law makes an affirmative showing that the
other state is interested. 33 Because no Saudi interest had been shown in
Walton, there was no reason to displace New York law. Therefore, Cur-
rie concluded, even though New York had no interest, the court should
have allowed plaintiff to recover under New York law.
34
Can it really be "normal and natural" for an Arkansas plaintiff
injured in Saudi Arabia by a Delaware defendant to recover under New
York law? The proposition seems inconsistent with our most fundamen-
tal intuition about law-that its function is to regulate human action and
its consequences. One would think that the applicable law ought nor-
mally to have something to do with the real world events that gave rise to a
dispute. To be sure, we give parties a choice of forums in which to liti-
gate. But that simply reflects our recognition that because courts in dif-
ferent locations possess the skill and facilities to conduct litigation,
making causes of action "transitory" can serve everyone's interests. It
has nothing to do with the applicable law. On the contrary, the concerns
that determine jurisdiction overlap only partially with the concerns
underlying choice of law.3 5 Why, then, should choice of law be made to
turn on the vagaries ofjurisdiction law and the happenstance of forum
selection?
3 6
Once one understands choice of law as a question of the sufficiency
of a claim or defense, moreover, it becomes clear that there is no need
for a presumption of forum law.3 7 In ordinary domestic cases, the plain-
tiff's complaint is presumed sufficient until the defendant challenges
33. Currie, SELECTED EssAys, supra note 3, at 9, 46-48, 75.
34. Note that the presumption of forum law is not sensitive to the outcome. Cur-
rie would have been just as satisfied to see the plaintiff's claim in Walton dismissed if
that had been the proper result under New York law.
35. For example,jurisdiction to adjudicate may turn on the convenience of litigat-
ing in a particular forum. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987). Similarly, while there is a state interest component to jurisdictional analysis,
it is different from the concept of interest used in choice of law. See id. at 114-15;
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The Supreme
Court has thus been careful to point out that just because a state may exercise juris-
diction does not mean that it may apply its law, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), and, con-
versely, that just because a state may not exercise jurisdiction does not mean that its
law may not apply, Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
36. Cf Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 82-
83 (1978) (noting that choice of law generally has a greater impact on the parties
than judicial jurisdiction).
37. The discussion below borrows from an earlier critique of Currie's first step.
See Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1301
(1989).
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it.3 8 Once the defendant challenges plaintiff's right to recover, this
"presumption of sufficiency" disappears, having served its purpose of
allocating the burden of raising the issue. The burden then shifts to the
plaintiff to show that his or her complaint states a claim-i.e., to show
that some law entitles him or her to recover on the facts pleaded. The
plaintiff can make this showing by citing appropriate legal authorities in
papers submitted to the court. However, because stating a claim upon
which relief can be granted requires supporting law, the plaintiff must
either identify a rule of positive law entitling him to recover or suffer a
dismissal.
To illustrate, recall the hypothetical tort claim discussed above, but
this time assume there is no statute authorizing recovery of punitive
damages in cases of vehicular collision. Because challenges to the suffi-
ciency of a claim may be waived, the plaintiff may still recover such dam-
ages if the defendant fails to seek a dismissal.3 9 Once the defendant
moves to dismiss, however, the presumption of sufficiency ceases, and
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come up with a legal basis for recov-
ering punitive damages on the facts alleged. Thus, suppose the defend-
ant moves to dismiss on the ground that the state's common law awards
punitive damages only on a showing of deliberate intent to cause injury.
If the court agrees and the plaintiff cannot in good faith plead this alle-
gation, the plaintiff must show the court some other law that entitles him
or her to punitive damages on these facts. Otherwise, the plaintiff's
claim will be dismissed.
These procedures work just as well in cases with multistate ele-
ments. In Walton, for example, if the defendant had not challenged the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff could have recovered
without any determination of whether his right was based on New York
or Saudi law. But the defendant did challenge the plaintiff's right to
recover, persuading the court that the plaintiff had no right under New
York law because the accident occurred in Saudi Arabia. At that point,
the presumption of sufficiency disappeared, and the burden shifted to
the plaintiff to cite some other law entitling him to recover. By failing to
do so, the plaintiff failed to establish that his complaint stated a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The court, quite rightly,
dismissed.
40
38. See cases cited supra note 24. The analysis is written from the standpoint of a
challenge to the plaintiff's claim, but it would be the same if the sufficiency of an
affirmative defense were at issue.
39. Id.
40. The plaintiff declined the trial court's offer to stay the proceedings so that he
could research Saudi law, choosing instead to risk an appeal on the question of recov-
ery under New York law. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's determina-
tion that New York did not give the plaintiff a right to recover because his injuries
were inflicted outside New York. The court then held that it was too late for the
plaintiff to argue that he was entitled to recover under some other law. Judge Frank
dissented, arguing that the plaintiff should be given another opportunity. Walton,
233 F.2d at 546.
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All this seems sufficiently straightforward to ask why Currie thought
he even needed a presumption of forum law. In Currie's system, state
interests ordinarily provide the basis for choosing the applicable law.
But there are cases, like Walton, in which interest analysis yields no defin-
itive solution. Yet "justice between the parties" still requires that a law
be chosen in order for the court to render a "decision on the merits."'4 1
And where else, Currie reasons, should a court look for the rule that will
best do justice between the parties than to "the body of principle and
experience which has served that purpose, as well as the ends of govern-
mental policy, for the people of [the state] in their domestic affairs?"
42
The conceptual understanding of choice of law implicit in this anal-
ysis is revealing. Deciding a case with multistate contacts, it seems, is a
two-step process: first the court chooses a law to govern the dispute, then
the court applies the chosen law and in this way renders "a decision on
the merits." Consequently, when the initial choice cannot be made by
analyzing state interests, some other basis must be found, because the
court cannot reach the merits until it chooses an applicable law. The
presumption of forum law fills this desideratum.
43
But where did Currie get the idea that "choosing" an applicable law
is something distinct from, and antecedent to, the process of "applying"
a law to decide the merits? The analysis in Part II-A suggests that this is
simply wrong. A plaintiff makes a claim for relief. To prevail on this
claim, the plaintiff must prove certain facts and show that a rule of posi-
tive law entitles him or her to relief on those facts. If the defendant
shows that New York confers no right because neither the parties nor
the conduct is connected to New York, the plaintiff must find some other
law that confers such a right. If the plaintiff fails to do so, the court may
dismiss, and its dismissal is on the merits-just like any dismissal for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
What is striking about Currie's analysis of this point is that it is so
needlessly conceptualistic-the very vice he attributed to traditional
choice-of-law theorists. That is, Currie needs a presumption of forum
law only because he assumes that choice of law is antecedent to and
independent of other aspects of the litigation process. I suspect that
Currie made this assumption because he defined choice-of-law problems
as arising only in multistate cases. Such a definition suggests that choice
of law is analytically distinct from questions that arise in ordinary
domestic litigation, thereby obscuring its relation to these questions.
Before leaving this subject, I want briefly to comment on a different
argument sometimes offered in support of Currie's initial presumption
41. Currie, SELECTED EssAys, supra note 3, at 64-65.
42. Id
43. Hence, in addition to cases like Walton, the presumption also dictates the out-
come in other cases that cannot be resolved on the basis of state interests, such as
"unprovided-for" cases and true conflicts litigated in a disinterested forum. See Cur-
ie, SELECTED EssAYs, supra note 3, at 152; Currie, The Disinterested Third State, supra
note 30, at 779-80.
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of forum law: the argument that judges are most familiar with their own
law. Perhaps this argument has some force in the international context,
where differences in language and culture increase the burden of com-
prehending foreign law. It may thus have had force in Walton, where the
record suggests that determining the content of Saudi law was extremely
difficult. In the typical conflict between states of the United States, how-
ever, this argument has no force at all. Access to the laws of sister-states
is easy given regional reporters, LEXIS, and WESTLAW; and legal and
cultural differences between states are sufficiently small to make com-
prehension easy. That judges might have to learn something new is
hardly a compelling argument. Besides, they can (and ordinarily
should) make the parties do this work in briefs submitted to the court.
Consequently, given the truly "normal and natural" assumption that the
applicable law should have something to do with the events underlying a
dispute, judges' familiarity with forum law is no reason at all for a pre-
sumption of forum law.
2. The Determination of Interests: Herein of False Conflicts, Renvoi, and the
Unprovided-For Case
Consider next the second, third, and fourth steps of Currie's method.
Taken together, these describe what is usually called "false conflict"
analysis. When one of the parties suggests that foreign law may apply,
the court must determine whether the forum or the foreign state is
"interested." Determining state interests is a two-step process: first the
court ascertains the "governmental policy" expressed in a law, then the
court asks whether "the relation of the [state] to the case is such as to
provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in the applica-
tion of that policy." 4 4 The process, explains Currie in an important dic-
tum, "is essentially the familiar one of construction or interpretation."
45
If analysis of the relevant interests indicates that only one state is inter-
ested, there is a false conflict and the court should apply the law of the
only interested state.
A vast literature on the subject suggests that this must be the most
puzzling aspect of interest analysis. Indeed, while I think I basically
agree with Currie, his analysis is sufficiently ambiguous that I cannot be
sure. Let me therefore begin by explaining how I understand the pro-
cess of identifying and resolving false conflicts before discussing ways in
which my analysis differs from Currie's.
To begin with, I do not think that anyone seriously questions that
there are such things as "false conflicts." Everyone agrees that laws
have a limited reach and that their scope has something to do with the
factual connections between the state and the transaction or occurrence
underlying a dispute. Whether a conflict is "true" or "false" thus
depends on whether the factual contacts are distributed in such a way
44. Currie, supra note 6, at 178.
45. Id.
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that more than one state's law applies. Strictly speaking, the labels
"true" and "false" are misleading, and it would be more accurate to say
that there is a conflict or there is not. Currie only used these terms to
distinguish the results under interest analysis from those under tradi-
tional jurisdiction-selecting rules, which treated every multistate case as
a conflict. Hence, cases that are not really conflicts but that would be
treated as such by the First Restatement became "false" conflicts. Be
that as it may, Currie's terminology has become conventional, which is
fine so long as one understands the underlying concept.4 6
Whatever terminology one uses, the problem is to determine which
cases fall in which category. Part II-A suggests a way to think about
making this determination. I argued there that we should analyze
choice-of-law problems in their ordinary procedural context rather than
from the broad theoretical perspective of allocating legislative jurisdic-
tion-bottom up rather than top down. The plaintiff alleges facts that
he or she claims justify awarding relief under the applicable law; the
defendant maintains that a different law governs and bars the plaintiff
from recovering. The court's first task is to determine whether a plausi-
ble argument can be made for applying both laws, which depends on
how we define the elements of a claim or defense based on these laws.
Making this determination is equivalent to Currie's "false conflict"
analysis.
Recall the hypothetical case discussed above. The plaintiff alleges
injury caused by the defendant's gross negligence and seeks punitive
damages under a statute authorizing such damages in cases of "vehicu-
lar collision." The defendant argues that the plaintiff may recover puni-
tive damages, if at all, only under the state's common law, which
requires proof of deliberate intent to injure. The court's first task is to
determine whether there is a plausible argument for applying both laws.
Thus, as noted above, there is no conflict if "vehicular collision" does
not include single car accidents.
The first step is the same in a multistate case. Hence, suppose that
the plaintiff is a citizen of Michigan injured in Michigan by a citizen of
Illinois. Suppose further that the plaintiff seeks punitive damages under
an Illinois statute. The question now is not just whether "vehicular col-
lision" applies to single car accidents, but also whether it includes acci-
dents occurring outside Illinois.
These two problems of interpretation-whether the statute applies
to single car accidents and whether it applies to accidents in other
states-are similar. With any luck, the statutory language will clearly
indicate the elements of a claim. With respect to the question of extra-
territorial reach, for example, the statute's applicability to an accident in
Michigan would be clear if it authorized punitive damages in cases of
46. In addition to true and false conflicts, there are "unprovided-for" cases in
which the factual contacts are distributed such that no law applies. These are dis-
cussed below. See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
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"vehicular collision in this or any other state." There might be a consti-
tutional question about whether Illinois could apply its law to such acci-
dents, and the plaintiff would have to demonstrate some other factual
connection to the state. But that is a separate consideration. 47 The
important point is that if a statute expressly specifies its scope, we can
determine whether there is a conflict without worrying about "govern-
mental policies" or "interests."
It is, however, highly unlikely that the statute will contain such a
provision since very few laws specify their territorial reach. But this sim-
ply means that the problem of construction is difficult rather than easy.
As where the question is whether "vehicular collision" refers to single
car accidents, the court must employ some other interpretive technique
to resolve an ambiguity in coverage.
Problems of this sort have received considerable attention in recent
years. One solution, advocated most vociferously by Justice Scalia, calls
for the court to follow a statute's plain language.48 The idea is to read
statutes as literally as possible, giving words their common or dictionary
meaning without "adding" content through extratextual interpolation
or resort to legislative history.4 9 But whatever may be said for this
approach as a general matter (which is not much), it is easily rejected in
the context of multistate choice-of-law problems. 50 Because lawmakers
seldom say anything about the territorial reach of their laws, plain lan-
guage analysis means reading laws to apply universally. This, in turn,
makes most cases into conflicts between the laws of every state-an obvi-
ously absurd result. Even taking constitutional limitations into account,
the number of conflicts would be enormous: every multistate case
would involve a conflict among the laws of every state with significant
contacts. 5 1 Such an interpretation needlessly maximizes the difficulties
47. Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-13 (1981).
48. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseco, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (ScaliaJ., con-
curring in thejudgment); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994-
95 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
49. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621 (1990); C. SUNSTEIN,
supra note 22, at 113-16; Zeppos,Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Pro-
cess, 12 CAtDozo L. REV. 1597, 1615-16 (1991).
50. Most recent scholarship on interpretation can be criticized on the ground
that, while presented as general jurisprudence, the analysis actually deals only with a
narrow set of problems associated with federal statutory and constitutional law. This
law is unique in many respects, including its subject matter, the professionalism of
the enacting legislature, and the separation of powers concern that affect its interpre-
tation and implementation. Given the sensitivity of interpretive norms to institu-
tional concerns, such as the quality of the judges or legislators, no analysis of legal
interpretation is complete without some consideration of state law (and probably for-
eign and international law as well). Many issues that seem easy from a federal per-
spective are less so from the states' point of view. Conversely, issues that are
controversial in the federal context may become relatively straightforward from the
perspective of the states. Plain language is an example of the latter, as the results it
produces in ordinary choice-of-law cases are totally unacceptable given widely shared
assumptions.
51. Cf., e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Phillips Petroleum v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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and tensions created by multistate disputes and is contrary to well rec-
ognized principles of comity and mutual accommodation.
There is, moreover, a better way to define the multistate elements
of a claim. The court can use a variation of the method it uses to fil
gaps and resolve ambiguities in ordinary domestic cases, which is to
ascertain the "purpose" of a law and extrapolate from that purpose to
the particular situation at hand. A small adjustment in this method is
required in the multistate context. In domestic cases, the court is called
upon to apply a law to some unforeseen substantive situation, while in
multistate cases the substantive circumstances are unchanged and the
question concerns the relevance of state boundaries. But this means
only that rather than extrapolating from a law's purpose, the court
should presume that the law applies only when that purpose is advanced
in the state. The process is still essentially the same. In both contexts,
the idea is to find the most reasonable interpretation absent any clear
expression of actual intent, and that interpretation is presumably the
one that advances the law's purposes.
5 2
Some illustrations should clarify how this process of interpretation
works. If the purpose of my hypothetical statute governing vehicular
collisions is to deter a particular kind of conduct (gross negligence in the
operation of a vehicle), the court would interpret it to apply whenever
the proscribed conduct occurred within the state. Similarly, if the pur-
poses of ordinary tort recovery rules are compensation and deterrence,
these rules would be interpreted to apply whenever the injured plaintiff
is either from the state or was injured there. And if the idea behind a
guest statute (to take a choice-of-law favorite) is to prevent artificial
inflation of insurance rates resulting from collusion, the statute would
apply whenever recovery would affect insurance rates in the state (i.e.,
whenever the defendant's car is garaged there).
These interpretations make the respective laws applicable in the
cases that presumably most concerned the state's lawmakers. These
lawmakers may, of course, want to do more. They may want to regulate
conduct and events in other states, and clear language or legislative his-
tory to this effect would support such an interpretation. But where a law
is silent with respect to territorial scope, as is true in the vast majority of
cases, a narrower construction makes more sense. Consequently, absent
some contrary indication, the better interpretation is to presume that a
state's law applies only when the factual contacts with the state implicate
the law's underlying domestic policy.
I want to clarify this analysis in several respects before comparing it
to Currie's. We are interpreting laws to fill a gap or omission in what
contact or contacts a state must have for its law to apply. The interpre-
tive technique employed to do this has two components: (1) ascertain-
52. In some cases, the court may have to determine both kinds of elements. In
my hypothetical tort case, for example, the court might have to decide both whether
"vehicular collision" refers to single car accidents and whether it refers to accidents
in other states.
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ing the purpose that led to the adoption of a law in wholly domestic
cases, and (2) presuming that the law applies only when that purpose is
advanced in the state. The first component is based on the idea that law
is a purposive endeavor-that laws are adopted for reasons and to
accomplish something. Given this, it makes sense to fill gaps or resolve
ambiguities by reference to those objectives, and the best interpretation
is the one that best accomplishes a law's goals.
This very simple, very sensible idea is at least four hundred years
old, 53 though today it is generally associated with legal process thinkers,
particularly Hart and Sacks. 5 4 In recent years, interpretation based on
an "attribution of purpose" has been criticized on the ground that statu-
tory purposes are multifarious and concatenated, hence indeterminate
and easily manipulated. Hart and Sacks tried to minimize these difficul-
ties by advising courts to interpret laws as if they were written by "rea-
sonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably." 55 But as
much recent commentary has observed, this is an unrealistic conception
of a legislative process that is often controlled by private interests and,
even when not, often operates irrationally.5 6 Besides, while a prescrip-
tion to be reasonable may work if there is a consensus about what acting
reasonably means, this exhortation is less useful when-as seems
increasingly to be true-fundamental values are contested. 5 7
Such criticism notwithstanding, few commentators (and even fewer
judges) actually reject purposive interpretation. Instead, they modify
the Hart and Sacks approach in a variety of ways to reflect a modem
appreciation of the realities of the legislative process and the power of
courts to make law.58 At one end are public choice models holding that
judges should identify and enforce the interest group deals that lie
behind legislation. 59 At the other end are models that highlight the dif-
ficulty of reconstructing legislative purposes and advise judges instead
53. See Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584).
54. 2 H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1413-17 (tent. ed. 1958).
55. Id. at 1415.
56. See, e.g., Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influ-
ence, 98 QJ. ECON. 371 (1983); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971);J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLI-
CIES (1984); Cohen, March & Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1972).
57. See C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 130-31.
58. In fairness to Hart and Sacks, I doubt seriously that they thought their model
accurately described the legislative process. Post-legal process scholarship may have
provided a more richly detailed description of potential defects in the lawmaking
process, but the basic insights have long been appreciated. Hart and Sacks undoubt-
edly recommended the use of a reasonableness canon because they thought it would
improve the legislative product.
59. See, e.g., Easterbrook, 1983 Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic System,
98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of
Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982). See generally Eskridge &
Frickey,supra note 22, at 702-10. ProfessorJon Macey has used the insights of public
choice theory to justify conventional "purposive" interpretation. See Macey, Promot-
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to engage in a self-consciously creative process of giving laws their
"best" interpretation in light of moral or political considerations.
60
Between these alternatives lie various proposals recognizing the useful-
ness of historical and legislative background but favoring judicial infu-
sion of values where these materials prove ineffectual or incomplete. 6 1
There is no need to debate the relative merits of these proposals
here. In essence, they all constitute efforts to broaden and deepen the
legal process model by including factors Hart and Sacks either over-
looked or underemphasized, and by stressing the constructive, inductive
nature of the interpretive process. Taken together, the various propos-
als establish at the very least that determining a law's "purpose" must be
understood broadly as a creative search for meaning in a definite social
and political context.
For the most part, the lessons of this work on interpretation seem to
have been lost on choice-of-law scholars. This is one of Professor
Singer's criticisms,6 2 and it is a point well taken. In determining a law's
purpose in domestic cases, judges must recognize and be sensitive to the
complexity of the issue. At the same time, we should not make a fetish
of complicating matters. The truth is that most laws, particularly at the
state level, serve relatively straightforward purposes that are either well
known or easily identified.
My disagreement with Professor Singer on this issue is thus largely
a matter of degree. Yes, I believe judges should be aware of the prob-
lematic nature of determining a law's purpose or purposes. But I do not
believe that such determinations are so inherently contestable that
judges should simply assume that a law applies whenever the state has a
contact that makes it constitutionally permissible. The fact that we can
imagine alternate stories about a law's purpose does not make these sto-
ries all equally plausible. Interpretation calls forjudgment. There is, of
course, often room to disagree, but that neither delegitimates the pro-
cess nor renders it unintelligible. 63 Imperfect as the process may be,
neither Professor Singer nor any other commentator has convincingly
shown that judges cannot make sensible decisions about legal purposes.
On the contrary, the long endurance of this method in the face of con-
stantly changing jurisprudential currents suggests that courts are able to
ing Public-Reaching Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223, 250-66 (1986).
60. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988);
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,
96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
61. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE ch. 9 (1986); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479; Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405 (1989); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law:
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982).
62. Singer, Facing Real Conflicts, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197, 206-17 (1991).
63. See Pildes & Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism, and Democratic Policies, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2205-10 (1990).
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perform this function adequately. 64
Once the court identifies and articulates the domestic policy under-
lying a law, the second step in interpreting it is to presume that the law
applies only when its policy is advanced in the state. The reason is sim-
ple. On the one hand, the positive law of a state reflects the judgment of
the state's lawmakers about the best way to organize society. On the
other hand, each state's lawmakers presumably recognize that other
states may have different views about what is best. The presumption
that a state's law applies whenever the domestic policy underlying that
law is affected reflects the former principle. The presumption that it
does not apply when domestic policy is not affected reflects the latter.
The presumption that a state's law only reaches cases affecting domestic
policy thus avoids conflicts while increasing the utility of all states by
facilitating each state's ability to regulate matters that affect that state's
domestic policies.
One final point should be made about the process of determining
whether a conflict is true or false (which is to say, whether there is a
conflict or not). Although the analysis focuses on the domestic policies
underlying the particular laws at issue, this is not because choice of law
is concerned only with such policies. As noted most recently by Profes-
sor Singer, lawmakers are also concerned with more general, systemic
issues, like discouraging forum shopping or not applying the state's law
to a person who could not have predicted it.6 5 But while such policies
should not be overlooked, they are not important at this stage of the
analysis. This is but a "first cut"-the idea being that there is no reason
to apply a state's law if the state's contacts are such that applying the law
would not further its underlying domestic policy. If more than one
state's domestic policy is affected, further analysis will be needed. We
can (and should) consider multistate policies in devising a solution at
64. Professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds draws an elegant analogy to the mathemati-
cian's "chaos theory." Like many seemingly simple natural processes that conceal a
great deal of complexity (Reynolds discusses a dripping faucet to illustrate his point),
one may be unable confidently to predict any particular outcome. It does not follow
that the system is not guided by consistent principles or that a coherent pattern will
not emerge over many occurrences, for the structure of a system may be coherent
and predictable even though no single occurrence is. Reynolds, Chaos and the Court,
91 COLuM. L. REV. 110 (1991).
Professor Singer's disenchantment with false conflict analysis stems in part from
his perception that it reflects a form of legal reasoning used only in multistate cases,
Hence, he defends his proposal to choose the law that best accords with justice and
wise social policy on the ground that this is how courts analyze purely domestic cases,
See Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U.L. REV. 1, 79-83 (1989). In fact, one seldom sees
judicial opinions that make the sort of open-ended inquiry Professor Singer recom-
mends other than in the multistate context (in states that use a "better law"
approach). Judicial practice generally conforms to the legal process model.
65. Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731, 746-55 (1990).
Other commentators have also made this point. See, e.g., L. BRILMAYER, supra note 8,
at 152-54; D. CAVERS, supra note 4, at 120-21; Hill, supra note 4, at 488-89. As Profes-
sor Kay observes, in his later writings Currie also began broadening his approach to
account for such policies. Kay, supra note 8, at 69-71, 133.
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that point.66
How does this analysis differ from Currie's? In some ways, not at
all. The way Currie determines whether a state is "interested"-ascer-
taining the "governmental policy" underlying a law and asking whether
the relation of the state to the case gives the state a legitimate interest in
pursuing that policy-is essentially the same as the interpretive process
described above. To say that a state is "interested" is equivalent to say-
ing that the state's factual contacts implicate the domestic policy under-
lying its law.
At the same time, explaining this process as one of interpreting laws
to fill a gap in identifying the elements of a claim requires rethinking
important aspects of governmental interest analysis. I shall discuss
three examples here: the power of the state to define its own interests,
the extent to which interest analysis solves the renvoi controversy, and
the problem of the unprovided-for case.
First is the question of who defines state interests. Interest analysts
appear to believe that while a state is free to choose its own policies, it
cannot create a governmental interest through its own actions. Thus,
Professor Bruce Posnak explains that while "the policy of a law is subjec-
tive, to be determined, where possible, by the state that promulgated the
law[, whether it is reasonable to conclude that those policies would be
advanced is objective with the forum having the final say."'6 7 On this
view, the underlying goal of interest analysis is to ensure the "rational"
implementation of state policies in multistate cases. It follows that while
states may choose the domestic policies they want to pursue, they may
apply laws embodying those policies in multistate cases only if this
"rationally" advances the policies involved. For interest analysts, then,
an objective test of rationality operates as an external constraint on
when states can apply their laws in the multistate context.
68
Where did Currie get such an idea? The whole point of Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins is that there is no general law, no " 'brooding omnipres-
ence' of Reason," 69 that limits states' power to make law. On the
contrary, the only external constraints on state lawmaking are those
embodied in some authoritative source of positive law, such as the Con-
stitution.70 But while decisions defining the constitutional limits of state
66. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
67. Posnak, Interest Analysis and Its "New Crits", 36 AM.J. COMP. L. 681, 687 n.42
(1988); see also Allo, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Response, 35 MERCER
L. REV. 565, 579 (1984).
68. Currie never states this explicitly, but it is a fair reading of his work. See Kay,
supra note 8, at 53-58; Brilmayer, The Other State's Interests, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233,
241 (1991). I am also indebted to Professor Bruce Posnak, who explained this point
to me in a personal letter (on file with the author).
69. The paraphrase of Justice Holmes is from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945).
70. State law may also be restricted by federal statutes enacted pursuant to the
Constitution. However, Congress has never exercised its power under the full faith
and credit clause to legislate choice-of-law rules.
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choice of law sometimes speak in terms of "interests," it is abundantly
clear that the constitutional test is broader than Currie's.71 And within
these constitutional limitations, states are free to do whatever they
want-including subordinating domestic policies in favor of multistate
goals like uniformity or predictability, or extending the protection of
domestic policy to citizens of other states. Put otherwise, within consti-
tutional limits, states are free to define their interests as they see fit. 72
If Currie thought differently, I blame the mistake on his approach-
ing choice of law as a problem of allocating the lawmaking power of
states. It is natural from this perspective to think in terms of what states
can or cannot do, and to see one's solution as reflecting the permissible
limits of legislative jurisdiction. Seen in these terms, interest analysis is
still considerably better than the First Restatement, which defines these
limits on the basis of arbitrary rules rather than domestic policies.
Nonetheless, to the extent that any allocative device is not required by
the Constitution, states may take it or leave it.
Approaching choice of law as a problem of defining the elements of
a claim or defense clarifies the true nature of the inquiry into domestic
policies. The court asks about domestic policies because it must fill in
the missing spatial element of a claim or defense, and purposive inter-
pretation remains the most acceptable means of doing this. But the
analysis merely identifies a presumptive reading; it does not reflect an
external limitation on what the law can provide. State lawmakers are
always free to define the applicability of their law in multistate cases dif-
ferently (so long as they remain within constitutional limits).
This point has several implications for choice of law. It means, of
course, that a state can accept the premises of interest analysis and still
reject it as a choice-of-law method-adopting even traditional jurisdic-
tion-selecting rules if it wants. This may be unwise. Perhaps the state
should forget about uniform, predictably applied choice-of-law rules
and concentrate on implementing domestic policies. But states are free
to go their own way on these issues.
Second, recognizing that the test of state interests is not objective
means that a state's lawmakers can specify the territorial connecting fac-
tors that make a law applicable. And if they do, their direction must be
taken to define the state's interests whether or not it is consistent with
Currie's interest analysis. Only the Constitution limits such decisions.
Finally, recognizing that state interests are not defined objectively
means that the renvoi remains a problem. Currie thought otherwise.
71. See Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 173, 180 (1981). At one point in her Hague lectures, Professor Kay hints that
Currie's test for state interests reflects constitutional standards, Kay, supra note 8, at
54, but she later concedes that the test for constitutionally valid interests is "looser"
than Currie's. Id. at 142-45.
72. I have discussed this point at length elsewhere. Kramer, Return of the Renvoi,
66 N.Y.U. L. REv. - (1991) . See also L. BRILMAYER, supra note 8, at 72-74, 94-103;
Brilmayer, supra note 68.
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Interest analysis, he suggested, should make the whole renvoi question
simply disappear:
Foreign law would be applied only when the court has determined that
the foreign state has a legitimate interest in the application of its law and
policy to the case at bar and that the forum has none. Hence, there can
be no question of applying anything other than the internal law of the
foreign state.
73
This would make sense if, as Currie believed, states could not deter-
mine their own interests. But it makes no sense once we recognize that
states are free to define the scope of their laws in multistate cases. The
fundamental premise of interest analysis is that choice of law is a process
of interpretation. Determining the applicability of another state's law
means interpreting that state's law, just as determining the applicability
of forum law means interpreting forum law. But interpretation makes
law; once interpreted, it is as if a law expressly said what the court has
construed it to say. There is, moreover, no general common law of
interpretation. Each state is free to adopt whatever rules of interpreta-
tion it deems appropriate, and these rules are themselves part of the
state's positive law. A court in one state called upon to apply another
state's law must therefore include whatever rules of interpretation
courts in the other state use.
It follows that foreign law must be interpreted in light of foreign
choice-of-law rules. A state's approach to choice of law by definition
establishes that state's rules of interpretation for questions of extraterri-
torial scope. This is true even if the state's approach was not self-con-
sciously adopted with this thought in mind, for its necessary effect is to
define the applicability of the state's laws in multistate cases. A state
may, for example, reject Currie's idea that states should be concerned
with implementing domestic policies and adhere to the First Restate-
ment on the ground that it furthers predictability and uniformity.7 4 Mis-
guided or not, this decision means that the state has chosen to
circumscribe the applicability of its laws according to these rules. Con-
sequently, the rules define the state's "interests" in the only sense in
which that concept is meaningful, and they should be respected by the
courts of another state.
The problem of the renvoi therefore remains, and the forum must
determine how to handle foreign choice-of-law rules. This turns out to
be surprisingly complex. Because I have discussed the problem in detail
elsewhere, I will limit myself on this occasion to describing conclusions
reached there.7 5 All choice-of-law systems necessarily serve two distinct
functions. First, they define the internal scope of a state's law and in this
way help to determine whether there is a conflict of laws. Second, they
73. Currie, supra note 6, at 178-79.
74. See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710 (S.D. 1989); Kay, Theory Into Practice:
Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv. 521, 583-84 (1983).
75. See Kramer, supra note 72.
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define the circumstances in which the state will forgo enforcing its other-
wise applicable law in deference to another state, thus determining how
conflicts that are found should be resolved. The proper treatment of
foreign choice-of-law rules depends on which of these purposes is being
served. To the extent that foreign choice-of-law rules serve the first pur-
pose and define the internal scope of foreign law, they are fully determi-
native and ought simply to be followed. This follows from everything
said above about how choice of law is a process of interpretation and
how each state's rules of interpretation are part of that state's positive
law.
Matters are more complex when choice-of-law rules serve the sec-
ond purpose of resolving true conflicts. In this guise, the rules do more
than interpret the internal scope of a state's law: they purport to iden-
tify a resolution that is best for other states as well. But no state's rule
has a privileged status from this multilateral perspective. Accordingly,
while the forum should consider whether the foreign state's rule pro-
duces a better multistate accommodation of interests, it should adhere
to the forum rule so long as it remains convinced that this rule is better
for both states (while writing an opinion that seeks to persuade the other
state to switch). In traditional choice-of-law parlance, the forum should
"reject the renvoi."'7 6
Separating the two functions identified above is more difficult under
some approaches to choice of law than others. Most modem
approaches consist of two steps that explicitly distinguish between these
purposes: a first step to determine whether there is a conflict and a sec-
ond step to resolve whatever conflicts are revealed. Following the analy-
sis suggested above is easy when the other state uses one of these
approaches. Other approaches to choice of law-in particular, the
Restatements and the various forms of "better law" analysis-merge the
two functions and consist of a single inquiry into the applicable law.
Careful analysis suggests, however, that these approaches basically pre-
sume that a true conflict exists whenever more than one state has signifi-
cant contacts. The single step of analysis is thus equivalent to the
second step of the two-step approaches in seeking to identify an optimal
multilateral accommodation of interests. It follows that, so long as the
forum remains convinced that its rule for true conflicts is better, it
should reject the renvoi and follow the forum rule.
A third way in which the approach outlined in Part II-A exposes
errors in Currie's analysis concerns the so-called "unprovided-for" case.
As noted above,77 a case is unprovided-for when analysis indicates that
no state is interested. According to Currie, the court should apply
forum law in such cases simply because nothing has displaced the initial
76. The one exception is where the other state uses conventional interest analysis
and always applies forum law in true conflicts, in which case the proper response is
for the forum to do the same. Id.
77. See supra note 43.
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presumption in favor of that law.78 Other interest analysts propose dif-
ferent solutions. 79 As I have explained elsewhere, however, there is no
such thing as an unprovided-for case.80 The supposed existence of such
cases results from a mistake in the way interests are analyzed-a mistake,
I should add, that is directly attributable to the failure to think about
choice-of-law disputes in their ordinary procedural context. Properly
analyzed, there are clear solutions to these cases.
Currie "discovered" the problem of the unprovided-for case in his
study of Grant v. McAuliffe. 8 Grant was injured when a car in which he
was a passenger collided with a car driven by Pullen. The accident
occurred in Arizona, but Grant and Pullen were both citizens of Califor-
nia. Pullen died from his injuries, and McAuliffe was appointed adminis-
trator of his estate. Grant sued the estate in California. Arizona
followed the common law rule that a tort action abates if it is not com-
menced before the death of the tortfeasor. California had abrogated
this rule by statute.
Currie used the case to illustrate how interest analysis works, vary-
ing the location of the relevant facts to generate and then resolve a
series of hypotheticals. The unprovided-for case turned up in Currie's
tenth hypothetical: a plaintiff from Arizona injured in Arizona by a Cali-
fornia tortfeasor. Currie reasoned that Arizona bars recovery so that
"the interests represented in the estate of the tort-feasor... should not
suffer because of what he did."'8 2 Therefore, applying Arizona law on
the facts of the tenth hypothetical would advance no Arizona interest:
"Though the injured person is both a resident of Arizona and is injured
there, Arizona has no policy of compensation for him."'8 3 California, in
contrast, permits recovery, favoring the injured person's interest in
being compensated. However, because the plaintiff in the tenth hypo-
thetical is from Arizona, applying California law would advance no Cali-
fornia interest.8 4 The case is thus unprovided-for because "Injeither
state cares what happens."
8 5
78. Currie, SELECTED EssAys, supra note 3, at 156.
79. See, e.g., D. CAVERS, supra note 4, at 106 (apply the law of the other state);
Posnak, Choice of Law: A Very Well-Curried Leflar Approach, 34 MERCER L. REV. 731, 777-
83 (1983)(choose according to Leflar's "choice influencing considerations"); Sedler,
The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25
UCLA L. REv. 181, 233-36 (1977)(apply the law that reflects the common policy).
80. The analysis in this section borrows from an earlier study of the problem. See
Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided-For" Case, 74 VA. L. REv. 1045 (1989).
81. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). See Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note
3, ch. 3.
82. Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 144. I agree with Professor Singer,
supra note 62, at 211-13, that this interpretation is questionable. See Kramer, supra
note 72, at 1048 n.21. However, because my purpose is to demonstrate how interest
analysis has been misapplied, I shall assume that Currie's understanding of Arizona
policy is correct.
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Consider how Currie analyzes this case. There is a choice-of-law
problem because there are multistate contacts, but the problem is
merely one of choosing between California and Arizona. Once a choice
is made, the case is decided as if it were wholly domestic to the chosen
state. Hence, Currie assumes that if Arizona law is applied, the case will
be dismissed because that is what Arizona does in domestic cases; if Cal-
ifornia law is applied, the case will go forward because that is what Cali-
fornia does in domestic cases. The problem in an unprovided-for case is
that the reason each state does what it does in a domestic case is miss-
ing: there is no Arizona estate or California tort victim to protect. As a
result, neither state cares whether its law is applied, and there is no rea-
son to apply either of them.
By now, it should come as no surprise if I suggest that only some-
one who-like Currie-defines choice of law as a problem of choosing
between states would analyze the case this way. If instead one analyzes
the case as it comes to the court, that is, as a problem of deciding
whether plaintiff states a claim or defendant has a defense, the fallacy in
this reasoning becomes apparent-as does the proper solution.
A plaintiff files a complaint alleging that he or she, a citizen of Ari-
zona, was injured in Arizona due to the negligence of the defendant, a
citizen of California. The defendant moves to dismiss on the ground
that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover on these facts. The first ques-
tion is, what law does the plaintiff rely on for a right to recover? Follow-
ing the interpretive method described above, the plaintiff cannot rely on
California law. Tort recovery rules are adopted in order to compensate
injured victims and to deter conduct the state wishes to discourage.8 6
We therefore presume that California extends a right to recover to vic-
tims who are either from California or who were injured there. Because
California's only contact in this case is that it is the tortfeasor's domicile,
plaintiff must look to the law of some other state for a right to recover.
How about Arizona law? Arizona, like California, gives injured
plaintiffs a right to recover from negligent defendants. Moreover, as in
California, because the policies underlying this law are compensation
and deterrence, we presume that Arizona gives this right to plaintiffs
who are either from Arizona or were injured there. The plaintiff in Cur-
rie's tenth hypothetical satisfies both conditions and can therefore claim
a right to relief under Arizona law.
The defendant, of course, answers that under Arizona law the plain-
tiff's claim abated when the tortfeasor died. Consequently, defendant
argues, the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed. Still following the
interpretive approach described above, however, the abatement rule
does not apply on these facts. Arizona confers a "right" on estates to
86. A state might adopt tort recovery rules for some other reason, but compensa-
tion and deterrence are generally accepted as the applicable policies, and courts in
most states would probably interpret their law according to such policies. I therefore
make this assumption to illustrate my point. The analysis might change, of course, if
Arizona or California law were interpreted to reflect different policies.
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have a plaintiff's tort claim dismissed in order to protect the
nonculpable interests they represent. Assuming this is its policy, Ari-
zona presumably extends this right only to Arizona estates, leaving
other states free to regulate their estates as they see fit. Because the
defendant is a California estate, it does not meet the conditions for
asserting a right based on Arizona's abatement rule.
8 7
The case is thus not unprovided-for at all: the plaintiff has a right
to recover under Arizona law.8 8 Currie overlooked this result only
because he mistakenly assumed that applying Arizona law necessarily
meant dismissing the case under Arizona's abatement rule. But that is
what Arizona provides in a case with no foreign elements. On the facts
of this case, Arizona allows the plaintiff to recover; the conflict is "false."
As I have argued elsewhere, moreover, analyzing cases this way provides
an equally clear solution in every case that is currently labeled "unpro-
vided-for."8 9 Once we approach choice of law from the proper perspec-
tive, the problem of the unprovided-for case disappears.
3. True Conflicts
Finally, consider Currie's fifth step, which presents his solution to true
conflicts: "If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the
application of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even
though the foreign state also has an interest in the application of its con-
trary policy.... "90 I already quoted Currie's explanation, which is that
courts lack the authority and resources to provide a genuine answer in
these cases because that requires weighing the competing interests of
sovereign states.9 ' But true conflicts must still be decided, and while
applying forum law may not be an ideal solution, Currie says, it is the
best solution available:
There remains the stubborn fact that under any conceivable conflict-of-
laws method the interests of one state will be sacrificed to those of
another whenever there is conflict. The only virtue of the method pro-
posed here is that it at least makes the choice of interests on a rational
and objective basis: the forum consistently applies its own law in case of
conflict, and thus at least advances its domestic policy.
92
This was not Currie's last word on the subject of true conflicts.
Responding to critics who attacked interest analysis as excessively paro-
87. Although I have described the analysis in terms of the "right" of the defend-
ant-estate, nothing important turns on this description; one could just as easily talk
about a limitation on the plaintiff's claim. The point is simply that if this "limitation"
is designed to protect estate interests, we presume that it comes into play only when
an Arizona estate is involved.
88. Note, however, that the privileges and immunities clause might require an
Arizona court to give defendant the benefit of Arizona's abatement rule. Kramer,
supra note 72, at 1065-74.
89. See id. at 1045-64.
90. Currie, supra note 6, at 178.
91. See supra note 19 (quoting Currie, supra note 6, at 176).
92. Currie, SELECTED EssAys, supra note 3, at 169.
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chial, Currie modified his approach by recognizing an intermediate step
enabling courts to avoid at least some true conflicts:
[Alnalysis may at first indicate an apparent conflict of interests; specifi-
cally, it may be clear that if the forum were to assert an interest in the
application of its policy, it would be constitutionally justified in doing so.
But no principle dictates that a state exploit every possible conflict, or
exert to the outermost limits its constitutional power. On the contrary, to
assert a conflict between the interests of the forum and the foreign state is
a serious matter; the mere fact that a suggested broad conception of a
local interest will create conflict with that of a foreign state is a sound
reason why the conception should be re-examined, with a view to a more
moderate and restrained interpretation both of the policy and of the cir-
cumstances in which it must be applied to effectuate the forum's legiti-
mate purpose.
9 3
Not all true conflicts can be avoided this way. In many cases, Currie
notes, both states will be unavoidably interested, and the court should
continue to resolve such "intractable problems" by applying forum
law.9 4 But at least some apparent true conflicts can be resolved by giv-
ing forum law a "moderate and restrained interpretation" in the interest
of comity. The process, exemplified by ChiefJustice Traynor's opinion
in Bernkrant v. Fowler,95 is discretionary and necessarily ad hoc.
96
Currie's treatment of true conflicts rests on two assumptions. First,
Currie assumes that the only genuine solution is to weigh or balance the
competing policies and choose the more "enlightened" one-some-
thing, he argues, that only the U.S. Congress has the authority and
resources to do. 97 Second, Currie believes that any solution based on
93. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, supra note 30, at 757. This intermediate
step is hinted at near the end of Notes on Methods, supra note 6, at 180 (noting that
"there is room for restraint and enlightenment in the determination of what state
policy is and where state interests lie"). It is more fully developed in Currie's study
of the Romero case, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. Cim. L.
REV. 1 (1959), and expressly incorporated into Currie's final methodological list of
steps to follow in analyzing a choice of law problem. See Kay, supra note 8, at 76.
94. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, supra note 30, at 763-64.
95. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906 (1961).
96. See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, supra note 30, at 764. It is unclear
whether Currie thought the forum could also reinterpret foreign law in this manner.
On the one hand, Currie's final list states that "[a] more moderate and restrained
interpretation of the policy or interest of one state or the other may avoid conflict."
Kay, supra note 8, at 76. On the other hand, Currie's analysis and illustrations all
involve a forum reinterpreting its own law, and anything else seems inconsistent with
the whole thrust of his analysis. The better reading therefore seems to be that Cur-
rie's intermediate step refers only to reinterpreting forum law.
97. See, e.g., Currie, SELECTED EssAys, supra note 3, at 117, 121-27, 167-70; Cur-
rie, supra note 6, at 176-77. Several critics suggested that reading forum law narrowly
in deference to another state's interests is indistinguishable from balancing. See
Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBs. 732, 734 n.9 (1963); Hill, supra note 4, at 476-77. Currie responded:
[T]hough the function is essentially the same, there is an important differ-
ence between a court's construing domestic law with moderation in order to
avoid conflict with a foreign interest and its holding that the foreign interest
is paramount. When a court avowedly uses the tools of construction and
VoL 24
1991 More Notes on Methods and Objectives
weighing is zero-sum, because the gain to one state from having its pol-
icy advanced is matched by the other state's identical loss. Until Con-
gress acts, then, the most "rational" thing a court can do is to apply its
own law and at least advance domestic policy-except that sometimes
the court may want to interpret its law narrowly to avoid conflict in the
service of restraint and altruism.
To understand what is wrong with this reasoning, we must consider
the relevant interests more carefully. Bear in mind, we are still engaged
in a process of interpretation-of defining the circumstances in which a
law should be construed to confer a right. Having examined each law
independently and having found the domestic policies of both impli-
cated, this fact itself becomes relevant. How is the ultimate enforceabil-
ity of a state's law affected by the concurrent applicability of another
state's law? Once again, this would be easy if laws included express
directions, but such provisions are rare. Accordingly, as in domestic
cases, the court must develop some further set of interpretive principles
to guide its decisions.
One concern (though, as explained below, not the only one) is
implementing the policies underlying the state's particular laws. Currie
assumes that always applying forum law is the best way to do this, which
would be true if every conflict was litigated in the forum. In practice,
however, states have little control over where suits are brought, and
many true conflicts will undoubtedly be litigated elsewhere. The states'
interests are thus interdependent in the sense that each state needs
cooperation from other states to implement its policies.
It follows that enforcing foreign law in appropriate cases may actu-
ally be a better way to implement forum policy because it invites recipro-
cal action that advances forum policies in cases brought elsewhere. If
every state adopts a "law of the forum" solution and always enforces its
own law in true conflicts, each state's policies will be advanced only in
true conflicts litigated in that state's courts. But states presumably care
more about some true conflicts than others, because some true conflicts
either affect more important purposes of the states' laws or affect these
purposes in more important ways. And between forum shopping and
declaratory relief (which enables potential defendants to shop for a
forum), there is no assurance that these cases will be litigated in the
state. Consequently, even from a purely selfish and parochial stand-
interpretation it invites legislative correction of error-or at least criticism
from the law reviews. When it weighs state interests and finds a foreign inter-
est weightier it inhibits legislative intervention and confounds criticism.
Currie, The Disinterested Third State, supra note 30, at 759. This is a curious answer. I
agree that courts can resolve true conflicts by interpreting laws without "weighing"
policies against some objective standard of value. But I do not see what that has to
do with inviting or confounding legislative correction. Whether the court reinter-
prets forum law ala Currie or declares a foreign interest superior, nothing prevents
the state's legislators from overturning the decision (and certainly nothing prevents
law review commentators from criticizing it). The legislature need merely pass a law
instructing the court to apply forum law.
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point, it may be advantageous for the forum sometimes to defer to for-
eign law in order to encourage other states to do the same.
Moreover, no state is interested only in advancing the domestic pol-
icies underlying its particular laws. Rather, states also have systemic
concerns or "multistate policies" that point toward the application of
foreign law in appropriate cases.98 These policies include comity
toward other states, facilitating multistate activity, providing a legal
regime whose enforcement is uniform and predictable, and discourag-
ing forum shopping. While not embodied in specific laws, such multi-
state policies nevertheless constitute an identifiable state concern that
courts should not ignore.
This analysis suggests first that, rather than being zero-sum, choice
of law is a variable-sum game in which some approaches to conflict reso-
lution are better for both states than others. This follows from two
points made above: (1) that states care more about some true conflicts
than others, and (2) that states have minimal control over where suits
are brought and cannot be sure that the cases they care about most will
be litigated in their courts. To be sure, because only one state's law can
be applied in any particular true conflict, neither state is able perfectly to
implement its policies. But some solutions may apply each state's law in
more of the cases each state cares about most. By making choice of law
turn on policy preferences rather than where suit is brought, then, we
can maximize the extent to which states realize their objectives in multi-
state cases. These gains may be further increased if our solution also
advances shared multistate policies.
Second, an approach based on maximizing state interests does not
require "balancing" or "weighing" the relative merit of state policies.
Rather than ask whether one state's law is "better" than another's in
some objective sense, we look for shared policies or policy preferences
around which to make trade-offs that enhance the likelihood that states'
laws are enforced in the cases they care about most. This may require
identifying preferences within each state, but even Currie acknowledged
the legitimacy of that inquiry when he recognized the courts' power to
give forum law a moderate and restrained interpretation.
Third, it is in the states' interests to articulate the desired trade-offs
in the form of rules rather than, as Currie suggested, on an ad hoc
basis. 99 This is so for at least two reasons. To begin with, a system of
rules does a better job of advancing multistate policies. Discouraging
forum shopping, ensuring uniform and predictable results, and facilitat-
98. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. It is far from clear that Currie saw
his intermediate step as achieving the sort of accommodation I am suggesting. In
fact, it is not entirely clear what Currie thought a court should consider in deciding
whether to interpret forum law narrowly, because he never discussed the issue in any
systematic way. As articulated in his late work-and no subsequent commentator has
developed the idea in greater detail-Currie's intermediate step amounts to making a
decision by intuition in light of vague suggestions to be "altruistic," "enlightened,"
"restrained," and like Chief Justice Traynor in Bernkrant v. Fowler.
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ing multistate activity, for example, all depend on increasing the likeli-
hood that a known result will be reached in the courts of any state.
Obviously, no system of rules can do this perfectly. Rules may be
manipulated, and it is impossible to avoid a certain amount of ad hoc
analysis in administering them.' 0 0 But a system that begins with and
emphasizes articulated rules will provide more predictability and uni-
formity than an avowedly ad hoc approach.' 0 1 This, in turn, will create
a more stable multistate system that-other things being equal-should
facilitate multistate activity and foster interstate cooperation.
More important, the approach to true conflicts suggested above
requires reciprocity from other states. The premise is that states can
maximize the extent to which they implement their substantive policies
by deferring to foreign law in appropriate cases. But this works only if
other states follow suit, for only then is a state's forbearance repaid by
the reciprocal forbearance of others, and only then will we achieve any
sort of uniformity in outcomes. But states cannot cooperate in this fash-
ion without the ability both to coordinate their handling of true conflicts
and to monitor each other's compliance-and that requires a system of
articulated rules for reference.1
0 2
What we need, then, is a set of interpretive rules designed to maxi-
mize state interests. Several strategies are available to develop rules that
satisfy this condition. First, we can identify situations in which both
states are more concerned with one type of policy than another. If
courts in both states then apply the law reflecting this preferred policy-
regardless of whose law it is in any particular case-both states should
benefit over time. Second, we can identify a shared third policy around
which to construct a tiebreaking rule. Because the conflicting interests
underlying specific laws will presumably balance out over time and many
cases, choosing the law that consistently advances the shared third pol-
icy again yields a marginal benefit to both states.
Translating these (and perhaps other) strategies into a workable
system of rules is not easy. Elsewhere, I presented five illustrations of
what such rules might look like.' 0 3 Rather than repeat or expand on
them here, let me simply offer several observations about the process of
formulating additional rules. First, the critical feature of these rules is
that they select an applicable law on the basis of the underlying policy
that will maximize both states' interests over time. The rules are thus
"policy-selecting" in contrast to the traditional "jurisdiction-selecting"
100. See Singer, supra note 64, at 7-33.
101. Apart from common sense, this empirical assertion finds support in the grow-
ing consensus among choice-of-law scholars that rules of some sort may be appropri-
ate after all. See Kramer, supra note 25, at 320-21 & n.147 (citing authorities).
102. The full story of how and why states may come to cooperate in choice-of-law
cases is considerably more involved. For present purposes, it suffices merely to note
that rules are critical to the enterprise. These issues are discussed further in id. at
339-45; and Kramer, supra note 72.
103. See Kramer, supra note 25, at 319-38.
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rules whose chief flaw was that they operated without regard for the con-
tent of the laws in conflict.
Second, it would be a mistake to try to derive a comprehensive sys-
tem of policy-selecting rules from a single theoretical premise. Resolv-
ing true conflicts is a process of accommodating conflicting and
overlapping substantive concerns that are enormously varied. Any
effort to articulate a single theory that encompasses so much variety is
likely to become so general as to be useless. (Is this not the lesson of the
Second Restatement?) The rules of interpretation used in domestic
cases are not derived from a single theory, and there is no reason to
expect anything different in the multistate context.
Third, domestic conflicts can be an important source of information
for multistate cases. To be sure, many solutions developed in the
domestic context are inappropriate in the multistate setting, because
they rest either on the fact that the conflicting laws come from a single
lawmaker 104 or on a normative preference for one lawmaker over
another. 10 5 But patterns observed in settling domestic conflicts may be
helpful in formulating multistate solutions. For example, when conflicts
arise between substantive and procedural policies in wholly domestic
cases, courts typically favor the substantive rule.' 0 6 This suggests that
states share a preference for substantive policies, which may provide the
basis for a multistate rule. If this observation is correct, a rule that
chooses the law reflecting a substantive policy in clashes between one
state's procedural and another state's substantive law will systematically
advance the preferred policies of both states: the forum sacrifices its
procedural policies in favor of another state's substantive policies, but
gains since its substantive law will similarly be respected in cases outside
the forum.10 7 There are undoubtedly other, similar patterns in the res-
olution of domestic conflicts, and these should provide a valuable source
of ideas for policy-selecting rules.
Finally, multistate policies may also provide substantive guides for
formulating rules to resolve true conflicts. Precisely because these poli-
cies are widely shared, they can serve as tiebreakers where the states'
particular domestic policies conflict. To illustrate, lawmakers in all
states presumably would agree that where the choice among legitimate
options is ambiguous, a party is presumptively entitled to the benefit of
an option on which he or she actually and reasonable relied. In wholly
domestic cases, the court may ignore this fairness consideration in order
to advance the policy underlying the law not relied on. In a multistate
case, however, that substantive policy is matched by the policy of
104. This is true, for example, of both the idea that laws can be read in pari maleria
and the canon that implied repeals are disfavored.
105. This explains, for example, the canon that statutory law trumps common law
and its predecessor that statutes in derogation of the common law should be con-
strued narrowly.
106. Kramer, supra note 25, at 328 & n.174 (citing cases).
107. Id. at 324-29.
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another state. We can break the tie by choosing the law on which the
parties actually relied. The state whose law is not applied forgoes an
opportunity to advance the policy underlying its law, but enhances the
likelihood that its law will be applied in other cases if the parties rely on
it. At the same time, the rule systematically advances the shared third
policy of fairness.' 0 8 Other multistate policies may similarly be useful in
particular situations as a basis for policy-selecting rules to resolve true
conflicts.
Conclusion
The analysis in Part II contains all the elements of an approach to ana-
lyzing choice-of-law disputes. Therefore, if I may imitate Currie's prac-
tice of listing steps to follow in resolving choice-of-law disputes,
rethinking the process in terms of defining the elements of a claim
implies a method along the following lines:
1. The legal sufficiency of a claim or defense may be presumed
unless and until challenged by a party-opponent. If properly challenged,
the party asserting the claim or defense must produce legal authority to
establish its validity.
2. If the parties raise a dispute involving inconsistent laws from dif-
ferent states, the court should first determine whether there is a plausible
basis for finding both laws applicable.
(a) To decide whether forum law may apply, the court should deter-
mine what policy or policies led to its adoption in wholly domestic cases.
The law is prima fade applicable if the state's factual contacts implicate
these policies in the state.
(b) The prima fade applicability of another state's law is determined
by the decisions of courts in that state. If there are no decisions on point,
the forum should determine prima fade applicability in light of the other
state's approach to choice of law.
3. This analysis may reveal that there is no conflict of laws because
only one law applies or the laws are not inconsistent or they provide
cumulative remedies. The court should dispose of such cases
accordingly.
4. If the analysis reveals that there is a "true conflict" because more
than one law is prima facie applicable and these laws are inconsistent, the
court should resolve it by following an appropriate policy-selecting rule.
These are rules which, if applied by both states, maximize both states'
interests.
5. If the other state uses a different rule to resolve true conflicts, the
court should reconsider its rule and ask whether the foreign rule pro-
duces a superior multistate accommodation of interests. If it does, or if
the rules are indistinguishable in this regard, the forum should adopt the
other state's rule. Otherwise, the forum should follow its own rule and
write an opinion explaining why it is better. There is an exception if the
other state follows a consistent practice-either explicit or implicit-of
applying its own law in true conflict cases. If that is the situation, the
108. Id. at 336-38.
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forum should do the same and apply its own law. 10 9
This list outlines a method for resolving choice-of-law problems.
Considerable work is still needed to fill in the details. The most impor-
tant area for future research is in developing policy-selecting rules for
true conflicts. As noted above, 1" 0 this cannot be done on the level of
general theory. We need to examine particular issue-areas and to
develop, test, and debate concrete proposals. Lea Brilmayer suggests
that ultimately we may need a Third Restatement so that courts can
adopt a comprehensive choice-of-law code."1 Perhaps she is correct,
but in the meantime it is up to us-scholars, students, lawyers, and
judges-to begin developing some of the specific solutions that might
constitute the body of such a code.
109. Various aspects of this method are discussed in greater detail elsewhere. The
treatment of foreign choice-of-law rules in steps 2(b) and 5 is explained in Kramer,
supra note 72, while the interpretive process described in steps 2(a), 3, and 4 is
defended in id; and in Kramer, supra note 25.
110. See supra p. 276.
111. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 8, at 185-89. I am more sanguine than she about the
possibility of multistate cooperation through common law adjudication, but agree
that a developed code of some sort is desirable. See Kramer, supra note 72. Given the
limitations of the restatement project, a uniform law is preferable since it can more
readily abandon or modify unsatisfactory aspects of existing practice. Kramer, On the
Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 90 MicH. L. REV. - (1991).
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